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QUESTIONS SURROUNDING VIRGINIA'S DEATH PENALTY
I. INTRODUCTION
On August 10, 1982, Frank J. Coppola died in Virginia's electric chair.
His was the fifth execution1 since the 1976 Supreme Court decision hold-
ing that a punishment of death was not unconstitutional per se.2 In the
Commonwealth of Virginia, Coppola's was the first execution in over a
decade.3
Coppola sought to waive his right to counsel and further appeal, hoping
to be allowed to die with "human dignity" on the set execution date.4 An
initial stay of execution was overturned by the United States Supreme
Court hours before expiration of the court order calling for his execution.5
The execution resurrected the debate on the purposes of capital pun-
ishment and heightened public awareness of the many questions sur-
rounding the death penalty. This comment briefly traces the evolution of
the death penalty as we know it today, and examines constitutional chal-
lenges to Virginia's capital punishment statutes in light of recent deci-
sions in state and federal courts. The issue of waiver of right to counsel
and further appeal is examined as well as the practice, on the opposite
extreme, of plea bargaining in capital cases and whether this practice pro-
motes voluntary decision or whether it is a product of duress.
II. CONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE DEATH PENALTY
A. Historical Background
The modern history of the death penalty began with the landmark de-
cision of Furman v. Georgia in 1972.6 The Supreme Court held that the
death penalty as applied was violative of the eighth amendment provi-
sion, incorporated to the states through the fourteenth amendment,
against cruel and unusual punishment.7 Although no opinion commanded
1. The four others were: Steven T. Judy in Indiana, March,1981; Jesse Walter Bishop in
Nevada, October, 1979; John Spenkelink in Florida, May, 1979; Gary Mark Gilmore in
Utah, January, 1977. See Richmond Times-Dispatch, Aug. 11, 1982, at A-2, col. 4.
2. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 169 (1976) (plurality opinion).
3. Prior to Coppola, the last person executed in Virginia was Carroll L. Garland, a Lynch-
burg man accused and convicted of first-degree murder, on March 2, 1962. See 66 VA. L.
REv. 167, 167 n.1 (1980).
4. Interview by United States District Judge D. Dortch Warriner with Frank J. Coppola,
reprinted in Richmond Times-Dispatch, Aug. 11, 1982, at A-2, col. 1-6.
5. Richmond Times-Dispatch, Aug. 11, 1982 at A-I, col. 5.
6. 408 U.S. 238 (1972) (5-4 decision).
7. Id. at 240.
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a majority or even a plurality of the Court,8 the effect of Furman was
virtually to overturn every death penalty statute then in existence."
Shortly after Furman, the states began to rewrite their death penalty
statutes to comply with the decision. The Supreme Court in Gregg v.
Georgia,'0 and its companion cases," reestablished the death penalty as
an acceptable form of punishment 2 and established certain constitutional
guidelines for states to follow. The Court held the use of a dual trial, one
for conviction and the other for sentencing, known as a bifurcated pro-
ceeding, relieves the threat of an arbitrary and capricious imposition of
the death penalty.13 The sentencing authority is to be apprised of rele-
vant information and provided standards to arrive at a decision in the
8. Each Justice wrote his own opinion in Furman. The four dissenters (Burger, C.J.;
Blackmun, J.; Powell, J.; & Rehnquist, J.) agreed that the death penalty is constitutional,
and the Court should leave to the state legislators the issue of sentencing procedures to be
followed by judges and juries. Id. at 375-470.
Of the concurring opinions, that of Justice Douglas concluding that the death penalty is
unconstitutional because of its overly discretionary application in an arbitrary, discrimina-
tory manner, is most often cited as the holding of the case. Id. at 249, 256-57 (Douglas, J.,
concurring). Two justices held that any death penalty statute is unconstitutional: "States
may no longer inflict [the death penalty] as a punishment for crimes." Id. at 305 (Brennan,
J., concurring); "In recognizing the humanity of our fellow beings, we pay ourselves the
highest tribute." Id. at 371 (Marshall, J., concurring). Justices White and Stewart fell short
of this extreme, but concluded there were several arguments in its favor. Id. at 310-14
(White, J., concurring); Id. at 306-10 (Stewart, J., concurring).
For an extensive analysis of the Furman opinions in light of recent law concerning the
death penalty, see Note, Administering the Death Penalty, 39 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 101,
106 (1982). Cf. Note, The Death Penalty in Georgia: An Aggravating Circumstance, 30 AM.
U.L. R.v. 835, 840 (1981) (discussing the lack of agreement on what constitutes cruel and
unusual punishment) [hereinafter cited as Aggravating Circumstance].
9. 408 U.S. at 411 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). Justice Blackmun stated that the state stat-
utes and those provisions of the federal statutory structure permitting the death penalty
have been "discarded without a passing reference to the reasons, or the circumstances, that
prompted their enactment. . . ." Id. at 412 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
10. 428 U.S. 153 (1976) (plurality opinion).
11. In two companion cases, similar results were reached concerning statutes comparable
to the Georgia statute questioned in Gregg. See Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242, 259-60
(1976) (plurality opinion) (Florida death penalty statute held constitutional since system
assures death will not be "wantonly" or "freakishly" imposed by allowing for evidentiary
hearings into whether death should be imposed, and if such results in the sentence of death,
a required writing to indicate the statutory reasons for the decision); Jurek v. Texas, 428
U.S. 262, 276 (1976) (plurality opinion) (Texas death penalty statute held constitutional
since it narrows the definition of capital offenses, allows for a separate sentencing hearing,
and states that there must be at least one statutory aggravating circumstance before death
as punishment could even be considered).
12. "[Tjhe death penalty is not a form of punishment that may never be imposed regard-
less of the circumstances of the offense, regardless of the character of the offender, and
regardless of the procedure followed in reaching the decision to impose it." Gregg, 428 U.S.
at 187.
13. Id. at 195. See GA. CODE ANN. § 27-2503 (1978).
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sentencing process.' 4 The Georgia statute examined in Gregg also re-
quired that an aggravating circumstance be present before imposition of
the death penalty could be considered. 15 The Court viewed this provision
as another safeguard against discretionary imposition of the death pen-
alty.'6 The Georgia death penalty statutes thereby were upheld as consti-
tutionally sound since the statutory scheme avoided arbitrary imposition
and broad discretion in application. 7
In two companion cases,' 8 the Supreme Court held, however, that state
attempts to limit discretion in sentencing through a mandatory death
sentence for certain homicides violated the eighth and fourteenth amend-
ments of the Constitution.'9 Such statutory schemes failed to take into
account any mitigating factors, such as the defendant's character, his past
record if any, or his state of mind.'0 States with similar statutes, Virginia
among them, were left to reformulate their capital punishment legislation
in light of these decisions. Many states adopted statutes similar to those
upheld in Gregg and its companion cases.2 '
The Supreme Court next examined the scope of the "mitigating fac-
tors" to be considered in sentencing. The Court in Lockett v. Ohio22 held
that an Ohio statute which enumerated the mitigating factors to be con-
sidered, failed to "permit the type of individualized consideration .. .
required by the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments in capital cases."'23
14. Gregg, 428 U.S. at 195.
15. Id. at 197. The Georgia statute listed ten aggravating circumstances for which a pen-
alty of death could be imposed. See GA. CODE ANN. § 27-2534.1(b) (1978). In addition to the
bifurcated trial and aggravating circumstances, the Georgia statute also provided automatic
review by the Georgia Supreme Court of all death penalty sentences in the state. GA. CODE
ANN. § 27-2537 (1978). For a detailed analysis of the Gregg decision, see Aggravating Cir-
cumstance, supra note 8, at 843-47.
16. 428 U.S. at 197-98.
17. The defendants in Gregg, Proffitt, and Jurek argued that arbitrariness still pervades
in the statutes since the language of aggravating circumstances "is so broad that capital
punishment could be imposed in any murder case." Gregg, 428 U.S. at 201. The plurality
held there is no reason to believe a court will adopt such an "open ended construction." Id.
at 201. For a summary of the constitutional challenges of this view, see infra note 24 and
accompanying text.
18. Roberts v. Louisiana, 428 U.S. 325 (1976) (plurality opinion); Woodson v. North Caro-
lina, 428 U.S. 280 (1976) (plurality opinion).
19. The plurality in Woodson concluded that imposing the death sentence on all of those
convicted of certain offenses is unduly harsh and not a proper response to the Furman
holding against unbridled jury discretion. 428 U.S. at 302.
20. Id. at 304 (Instead of treating the offender as an individual, the process of mandatory
sentencing results in the offender being treated as a "faceless, undifferentiated mass to be
subjected to the blind infliction of the penalty of death.").
21. Virginia modeled her 1977 death penalty legislation after the Georgia and Texas stat-
utes held constitutional in Gregg and Jurek. See infra notes 33-36 and accompanying text.
22. 438 U.S. 586 (1978).
23. Id. at 606 (the "constitutional infirmities" of the Ohio statute are illuminated when
compared with the statutes upheld in Gregg, Proffitt, and Jurek).
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The sentencing authority must be able to consider "any aspect of a de-
fendant's character or record and any of the circumstances of the offense"
which can justify "a sentence less than death."'"
The constitutional attacks culminated in the Supreme Court case of
Godfrey v. Georgia,5 which again challenged the Georgia death penalty
statute, this time for "broad and vague construction" of the provision on
aggravating circumstances required for a sentence of death.2" The Court
upheld the validity of the Georgia statute, but reversed the death sen-
tence due to the failure of the Georgia Supreme Court to follow its own
precedent defining the criteria for "aggravating circumstances. '27 While
statutory language may be interpreted broadly, the state courts and other
authorities are given only the discretion to interpret the language in a
constitutionally permissible way,28 which the Georgia courts had done in
the past.2 9 Since the statutory language can be and was previously defined
in a constitutional way, the death penalty legislation passed constitu-
tional muster.30
24. Id. at 604. For a summary of the constitutional standards of the death penalty in light
of mitigating factors and Virginia's response to the Supreme Court decisions, see Bonnie,
Psychiatry and the Death Penalty: Emerging Problems in Virginia, 66 VA. L. REV. 167
(1980).
25. 446 U.S. 420 (1980).
26. Id. at 423. The defendant challenged the "open ended construction" of the statute by
the Georgia Supreme Court which the plurality in Gregg had held there was "no reason to
assume" would occur. Gregg, 428 U.S. at 201. See also supra note 17 and accompanying text
(discussing the "arbitrariness" claim of the defendants in Gregg and its companion cases).
The challenged statute said a person may be sentenced to death when convicted of mur-
der if the offense "was outrageously or wantonly vile, horrible or inhumane in that it in-
volved torture, depravity of mind, or an aggravated battery to the victim." GA. CODE ANN. §
27-2534.1(b)(7) (1978) construed in Godfrey v. Georgia, 446 U.S. 420, 422 (1980).
27. 446 U.S. at 431-32 (noting that the Georgia Supreme Court previously had defined
"depravity of mind" to be that "kind of mental state that led the murderer to torture or to
commit an aggravated battery before killing his victim," and defining "torture" and "aggra-
vated battery" to be "serious physical abuse of the victim before death").
28. Id. at 432.
[T]he validity of the petitioner's death sentence turns on whether, in light of the
facts and circumstances of the murders.., the Georgia Supreme Court can be said
to have applied a constitutional construction of the phrase "outrageously or wantonly
vile, horrible or inhumane in that [they] involved.., depravity of mind ...."
Id.
29. See Blake v. State, 239 Ga. 292, 236 S.E.2d 637 (1977); see also Harris v. State, 237
Ga. 718, _ 230 S.E.2d 1, 11 (1976) (court recognized possibility of abuse of the aggravat-
ing circumstances statute and said it would use its discretion to restrict application to
"those cases that lie at the core"). See generally 446 U.S. at 430, 431 nn.10-11 (listing those
Georgia cases rejecting the constitutional challenges to the construction of the aggravating
circumstances statute).
30. The Supreme Court did not say this as such in Godfrey. The plurality opinion reiter-
ated past decisions against arbitrary and capricious sentencing, and then moved on to the
question of constitutional application. Id. at 428-29.
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B. Application of the Death Penalty in Virginia
In 1977, the Virginia legislature adopted a death penalty statute to
comply with the decisions of Gregg v. Georgia31 and its companion
cases.3 2 The statutes allow for imposition of the death penalty in capital
cases,33 when there is a finding of "aggravated circumstances."'3 The sen-
tencing authority, however, must examine all mitigating factors, including
those not enumerated in the statute.35 If a death sentence is rendered, the
case is automatically reviewed by the Virginia Supreme Court,'3 at which
time any such factors are subject to review.
The Virginia Supreme Court made its first major pronouncement on
the 1977 death penalty statutes in Smith v. Commonwealth,'7 upholding
the constitutionality of the statutes, citing Gregg and its progeny.38 In a
discussion of aggravating circumstances, the court interpreted the statu-
tory "vileness" standard 9 by defining "depravity of mind" as "a degree of
moral turpitude and physical debasement surpassing that inherent in the
definition of ordinary legal malice and premeditation."' 0 Further, "aggra-
vated battery" was defined as "a battery which ... is more culpable than
the minimum necessary to accomplish the act of murder."'11 These defini-
tions were seen as "the only constructions rationally related"' 2 to the
statutory language and have been followed in subsequent decisions.4
3
31. 428 U.S. 153 (1976) (plurality opinion).
32. See supra notes 16 & 18.
33. VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-31 (Repl. Vol. 1982).
34. VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-264.2 (Cum. Supp. 1982) provides:
In assessing the penalty of any person convicted of an offense for which the death
penalty may be imposed, a sentence of death shall not be imposed unless the court or
jury shall (1) after consideration of the past criminal record of convictions of the
defendant, find that there is a probability that the defendant would commit criminal
acts of violence that would constitute a continuing serious threat to society ['danger-
ousness' standard] or that his conduct in committing the offense for which he stands
charged was outrageously or wantonly vile, horrible or inhuman in that it involved
torture, depravity of mind or an aggravated battery to the victim ... ['vileness'
standard].
35. VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-264.4 (Cum. Supp. 1982) ("[flacts in mitigation may include but
shall not be limited to.. ."). See infra notes 43 & 47 and accompanying text.
36. VA. CODE ANN. § 17-110.1 (Repl. Vol. 1982).
37. 219 Va. 455, 248 S.E.2d 135 (1978), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 967 (1978).
38. Id. at 476-79, 248 S.E.2d at 148-49.
39. See supra note 34.
40. 219 Va. at 478, 248 S.E.2d at 149.
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. See, e.g., Whitley v. Commonwealth, 223 Va. 66, 78-79, 286 S.E.2d 162, 169-70 (1982).
See also Clark v. Commonwealth, 220 Va. 201, 257 S.E.2d 784, 790 (1979) (relying on the
definitions of Smith, but stating that the terms need not be defined to the sentencing au-
thority because the enumerated terms need not be "the best or the only [definitions]"), cert.
denied, 444 U.S. 1049 (1979); Coppola v. Commonwealth, 220 Va. 243, 254, 257 S.E.2d 797,
805 (1979) (holding the words of the statute need not be defined in jury instructions), cert.
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Concerning the "dangerousness" standard of aggravating circumstances, 4
the court held that "the Commonwealth must prove beyond a reasonable
doubt that there is a 'probability' that the defendant would commit
'criminal acts of violence' such as would pose a 'continuing serious threat
to society.' ",45 This definition also has been accepted in subsequent
decisions.4
Finally, the Smith court noted in dicta that an additional safeguard
against unconstitutional arbitrariness exists in the Virginia statutes. The
court recognized that the Virginia statute expressly provides that the list
of mitigating circumstances which may be considered by the sentencing
authority is not limited to those enumerated, but that evidence may be
adduced to show any other facts in mitigation of the offense. This addi-
tional safeguard contrasts with statutes held to be constitutional by the
Supreme Court which were silent in this regard.47
C. Recent Cases and the Question of Constitutionality
The decision in Godfrey led to the belief that the death penalty in Vir-
ginia was under attack because of its vague construction. 4 The United
States Supreme Court upheld the facial constitutionality of Georgia's
death penalty statute and questioned only its application in light of the
Georgia Supreme Court's own criteria.49 The Virginia Supreme Court also
has established and followed its own criteria, and has distinguished God-
frey in subsequent attacks on the statutes" as has at least one federal
court. 51
denied, 444 U.S. 1103 (1980).
44. See supra note 34.
45. Smith, 219 Va. at 477, 248 S.E.2d at 148.
46. See, e.g., Martin v. Commonwealth, 221 Va. 436, 271 S.E.2d 123 (1980); Stamper v.
Commonwealth, 220 Va. 260, 257 S.E.2d 808 (1979), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 972 (1980).
47. 219 Va. at 479, 248 S.E.2d at 149. The Smith court directly compared the Virginia
statute to the Texas statute found to be constitutional in Jurek. See Jurek, 428 U.S. at 272.
Accord Clark v. Commonwealth, 220 Va. at 211, 257 S.E.2d at 791. See also Waye v. Com-
monwealth, 219 Va. 683, 700, 251 S.E.2d 202, 212 (1979) (stating that there is no constitu-
tional infirmity in allowing the jury the discretionary authority to afford the defendant
mercy when considering mitigating factors), cert. denied, 442 U.S. 924 (1979).
48. For a comment on the Godfrey decision and the problems of Virginia's death penalty
law, see Comment, Godfrey v. Georgia: Possible Effects on Virginia's Death Penalty Law,
15 U. RiCH. L. REv. 951 (1980) [hereinafter cited as Death Penalty Law].
49. See supra notes 27-30 and accompanying text.
50. See Briley v. Commonwealth, 221 Va. 563, 579, 273 S.E.2d 57, 66 (1980) (holding
sufficient facts present to meet the criteria set down in Smith and subsequent cases which
were distinguishable from the failure of the Georgia Supreme Court to follow the criteria
established in Godfrey); Turner v. Commonwealth, 221 Va. 513, 526, 273 S.E.2d 36, 44
(1980) (holding Godfrey "rested upon its unique facts"), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 1011 (1981).
51. Stamper v. Baskerville, 531 F. Supp. 1122, 1129-30 (E.D. Va. 1982), appeal filed, No.
82-6152 (4th Cir. May 27, 1982). See infra note 68.
DEATH PENALTY
Recent United States Supreme Court decisions have not questioned the
constitutionality of state legislation. The Supreme Court, however, reiter-
ated the Lockett decision, emphasizing that all mitigating circumstances
must be considered by the sentencing authority in the sentencing phase
of a capital trial.52 The Court also remanded a case to the Supreme Court
of Georgia for further explanation of state law.53 However, state authori-
ties have been given extreme deference in decisions where the death pen-
alty has been imposed. 54 A statute rarely is challenged as being unconsti-
tutional "on its face." Rather, the constitutionality of the statutory
application is questioned,55 primarily in reference to its failure to define
statutory terms for the sentencing authority.56
Thus, there is a chance, however slim, that an attack on the Virginia
death penalty statutes would succeed on the grounds of arbitrary and ca-
pricious application. 57 A successful attack might rest on an unconstitu-
tional application in light of Godfrey.5 If a state's statutory definitions
do not fall below the minimum standards set forth in Gregg,59 such an
attack is likely to fail. Virginia courts, in adhering to the definitions set
down in Smith, probably would not run the risk of overstepping the con-
stitutional boundaries.8
III. WAIVER OF COUNSEL AND APPEAL IN DEATH PENALTY CASES
A. Coppola and the Question of Competency
Of the five convicted felons executed since Gregg, only one vigorously
52. Eddings v. Oklahoma, - U.S. -, 102 S. Ct. 869 (1982) (holding family history can
be considered in the mitigation of the death penalty).
53. Zant v. Stephens, - U.S. _, 102 S. Ct. 1856 (1982) (per curiam) (remanding to the
Georgia Supreme Court for explanation of the rationale behind a state law which allows
imposition of the death penalty if any one of three aggravating factors found by the jury is
set aside by the court on appeal).
54. See Donohue, Godfrey v. Georgia: Creative Federalism, the Eighth Amendment, and
the Evolving Law of Death, 30 CATH. U.L. REv. 13 (1980).
55. The Supreme Court did warn in Zant, however, that Georgia's determinations on re-
mand "might undermine the confidence ... expressed in Gregg v. Georgia ...... Zant, -
U.S. at -, 102 S. Ct. at 1859.
56. See supra note 43.
57. See supra notes 43-47 and accompanying text.
58. See supra note 50.
59. See supra notes 10-17 and accompanying text. See also, Donohue, supra note 54, at
60-61 (describing the ability of a state's sentencing authority to weigh the aggravating and
mitigating circumstances in light of the courts' definitions of statutory terms as "creative
Federalism" which mandates dramatic changes in death penalty review). Contra Combs,
The Supreme Court and Capital Punishment: Uncertainty, Ambiguity, and Judicial Con-
trol, 7 So. U.L. REv. 1, 38-39 (1980) (arguing Gregg and companion cases enhance the con-
trol of the United States Supreme Court in formulating death penalty policies).
60. Contra, Death Penalty Law, supra note 48 (concluding Virginia's death penalty laws
face future problems in light of the Godfrey decision).
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attacked his sentence and went to his execution against his will."1 The
others chose, as did Coppola, to forego further appeal and allow the sen-
tence to be carried out on the designated date.
Frank Coppola was sentenced to death for murder committed while in
the act of robbing the victim's home.6 2 In Coppola v. Commonwealth,6 3
the Virginia Supreme Court upheld Coppola's death sentence since the
evidence indicated Coppola had "repeatedly beat[en] [the victim's] head
against the floor," an action sufficient to constitute "aggravated battery"
as defined in Smith.6 4 The conviction was upheld twice by the Virginia
Supreme Court and denied review by the United States Supreme Court.
Thereafter, Coppola fired his attorneys and asked that his sentence be
carried out as planned. 5
One of Coppola's former attorneys initiated an appeal to the United
States District Court through a "next friend" petition.6 6 The district
court denied a stay of execution based on its finding that Coppola was
competent to waive his right to counsel and further appeal.6 7 The Court
of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, however, overturned the decision and
granted a stay of execution on the basis that the constitutionality of Vir-
ginia's death penalty statute was being challenged in court at that time.6 8
In a five to two vote,66 the United States Supreme Court, at the request
61. John A. Spenkelink was executed in May, 1979, in Florida after 22 unsuccessful ap-
peals. See Coleman v. Balkcom, 451 U.S. 949, 956-64 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting from denial
of cert.) (arguing the ineffectiveness of the death penalty and the "constitutional stalemate"
preventing states from administering it). See generally Note, Administering the Death Pen-
alty, 39 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 101 (1982) (discussing death-row inmates' avenues of appeal
and the defects inherent in the system).
62. VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-31(d) (Repl. Vol. 1982) (establishing as a capital offense "[tihe
willful, deliberate and premeditated killing of any person in the commission of robbery
while armed with a deadly weapon").
63. 220 Va. 243, 257 S.E.2d 797 (1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1103 (1980).
64. Clark v. Commonwealth, 220 Va. at 211, 257 S.E.2d at 805 (quoting Smith v. Com-
monwealth, 219 Va. 455, 248 S.E.2d 135, cert. denied, 441 U.S. 967 (1978)). See supra notes
35-40 and accompanying text.
65. Richmond Times-Dispatch, Aug. 11, 1982, at A-1 col. 2-3.
66. Id. See infra note 73 and accompanying text.
67. Richmond Times-Dispatch, Aug. 11, 1982, at A-1, col. 2. See infra notes 73-78 and
accompanying text.
68. Richmond Times-Dispatch, Aug. 11, 1982, at A-1, col. 2. See Stamper v. Baskerville,
No. 82-6151 (4th Cir. May 27, 1982). On the day of argument in the Stamper case, the
Fourth Circuit remanded the case to the district court since it raised issues on appeal in the
federal court not addressed at the state court proceedings. Virginia prosecutors then at-
tempted to have the inmate's "exhaustion of state remedies" requirement waived by the
United States Supreme Court. This attempt was denied, and the case is likely to return to
Virginia state courts. See Richmond Times-Dispatch, Feb. 23, 1983, at B-1, col. 2 and B-8,
col. 4.
69. Justices Brennan and Marshall voted to uphold the stay. Justice O'Connor, unable to
be reached, took no part in the vote. Justice Stevens abstained, desiring more information
before making a decision. See Richmond Times-Dispatch, Aug. 11, 1982, at A-1, col. 3.
[Vol. 17:603
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of the Commonwealth of Virginia, ruled to overturn the stay of execution
and allow the sentence to be carried out as planned.
7 0
The rejection of the initial stay of execution in the district court rested
on the issue of Coppola's competency to decide to forego further appeal.
Imposition of the death penalty is subject to automatic review in many
states,7 1 including Virginia.72 However, the question of a defendant's abil-
ity to waive his discretionary appeals is one in which the defendant's
competency becomes an issue. Under the theory that the death-row in-
mate is incapable of petitioning for a stay of execution, courts have al-
lowed eleventh-hour efforts by a "next friend" because of the inmate's
presumed mental incompetency or related infirmities.7 3 However, the Su-
preme Court in Gilmore v. Utah 4 terminated a stay of execution saying
the defendant had "made a knowing and intelligent waiver of any and all
federal rights he might have asserted after the ... sentence was im-
posed. . . . 15 The Court added that the "next friend" had "no standing
to litigate an Eighth Amendment claim"76 in light of Gilmore's competent
waiver.7 7 This view has been reiterated in subsequent cases.7 8 The capital
defendant who is mentally competent therefore is able to dismiss his
counsel and waive discretionary review of his death sentence.
B. State Assisted Suicide?
In Lenhard v. Wolff,7 9 two justices dissented from the Court's termina-
tion of a stay of execution, and concluded that "[b]y refusing to pursue
his Eighth Amendment claim, . . . [the convicted] has, in effect, sought
the State's assistance in committing suicide."' 0 The dissent emphasized
70. Richmond Times-Dispatch, Aug. 11, 1982, at A-2, col. 2.
71. Those states with automatic appeals statutes are: Alabama, Arizona, California, Dela-
ware, Florida, Georgia, Idaho, Louisiana, Maryland, Nevada, New Hampshire, Oklahoma,
Pennsylvania, Virginia, and Wyoming. See Comment, The Death Row Right to Die: Suicide
or Intimate Decision?, 54 S. CAL. L. REv. 575 (1981) [hereinafter referred to as Right to
Die].
72. VA. CODE ANN. § 17-110.1 (Repl. Vol. 1982).
73. See Lenhard v. Wolff, 443 U.S. 1306 (1979), vacating stay of execution, 444 U.S. 807-
(1979); see also, Evans v. Bennett, 440 U.S. 987 (1979) (desire of wanting to die submitted
as evidence of incompetency), vacating stay of execution, 444 U.S. 1301 (1979). See gener-
ally Right to Die, supra note 71, at 585; H. BEDAU, THE COURTS, THE CoNsTrrrTIoN AND
CAP r AL PUNISHMENT 121-25 (1977).
74. 429 U.S. 1012 (1976).
75. Id. at 1013.
76. Id. at 1017 (Stevens & Rehnquist, JJ., concurring).
77. Id. at 1016 (Burger C.J., & Powell, J., concurring).
78. See Lenhard, 443 U.S. at 1309 (Rehnquist, Circuit Justice). See also, 440 U.S. at
1303-06 (Rehnquist, Circuit Justice) (citing Proffitt, Jurek, & Woodson, as setting the stan-
dards in which the death sentence is constitutional, as well as the Gilmore decision on
standing of the "next friend").
79. 443 U.S. 1306 (1979), vacating stay of execution, 444 U.S. 807 (1979).
80. 444 U.S. at 811-12 (Marshall, J., dissenting). See also, Richmond Times-Dispatch,
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the inmate's complaints of "inhumane conditions" in the prison which
caused him to declare that "he would rather die than remain incarcer-
ated,""1 his desire to be executed swiftly "so that his family [would] suffer
for the shortest possible period,' ' 2 and his belief in the indignity of
"ask[ing] for mercy."' There was nothing new in this death-row inmate's
articulation of these reasons for accepting his sentence. Gary Gilmore had
voiced similar complaints,84 which led the dissent in that case to conclude
that Gilmore could not "competently, knowingly, and intelligently ...
[decide] to let himself be killed."85 The majority did not reply to the dis-
sent's assertions in any of the cases. In each case, Gilmore and Hammett
v. Texas, for example, the stay was terminated on the grounds that the
defendant was competent to waive further appeal.8"
Frank Coppola made similar arguments to those in Gilmore and
Lenhard in order to ensure that his execution was carried out. Coppola
stated: "I have human dignity. I'm a person, and I like myself. I cannot
see subjecting myself to all of these mitigating circumstances any
longer .... ,,s1 He also added that his "family was suffering" and said the
incident "adversely affect[ed] [his] kids among their peers."8s Considering
the district court's finding of competency, it was not surprising when
Chief Justice Burger, acting as circuit justice, terminated the stay of exe-
cution granted by the Fourth Circuit.8 9 The decision was in accordance
with prior holdings addressing the same issue.90 While an argument has
been made that allowing the defendant to choose to die is "state-assisted
suicide,"9 1 the courts seem disinclined to retreat from the position that
discretionary appeals may be waived.
Aug. 11, 1982, at A-2, col. 1 (arguing the view of the dissent to achieve a stay of execution
for Coppola).
81. 444 U.S. at 811 n.2. See also Right to Die, supra note 71, at 600.
82. 444 U.S. at 811 n.2.
83. Id.
84. Gilmore, 429 U.S. at 1015 n.4.
85. Id. at 1019 (Marshall, J., dissenting). See also, Hammett v. Texas, 448 U.S. 725, 726
(1980) (Marshall & Brennan, J.J., dissenting) (reiterating that the termination of a con-
victed felon's stay of execution when the condemned chose to waive further appeal is
"'state-administered suicide' ") (quoting Lenhard v. Wolff, 444 U.S. 807, 815 (1979) (Mar-
shall, J., dissenting)).
86. See Gilmore, 429 U.S. at 1013; Hammett, 448 U.S. at 725.
87. Interview by United States District Judge D. Dortch Warriner with Frank J. Coppola,
reprinted in Richmond Times-Dispatch, Aug. 11, 1982, at A-2, col. 5.
88. Id. at A-2, col.3.
89. See Lerner, The Court Opts for Death, N.WSWEEK, Aug. 23, 1982, at 28.
90. See supra notes 74-78 and accompanying text.
91. See, e.g., Lenhard v. Wolff, 444 U.S. 807, 815 (1979) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
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IV. EFFECT OF THE DEATH PENALTY: DURESS AND THE PLEA BARGAIN
A. The Self-Convicted Inmate
The question of voluntary decision-making in plea bargaining has been
a topic of discussion throughout criminal law.9 2 Plea bargaining is the
predominant means of disposing of criminal offenses and serves both to
ease the congestion of criminal dockets and to afford both prosecutor and
defendant an opportunity to maximize their chances and minimize their
losses.9 3 However, legal writers and scholars have questioned the constitu-
tionality of this process in capital cases in light of the duress caused by
the possible imposition of the death penalty.
9 4
Harry Seigler was charged with brutally murdering an insurance agent
during the course of a robbery.95 During his trial for capital murder, car-
rying a possible sentence of death, the jury deliberated for more than four
and one-half hours. Siegler earlier resisted any talk of plea bargaining,
but agreed to plead guilty to first-degree murder in exchange for a forty-
year prison sentence.98 The trial occurred a few days after the Coppola
execution, and Seigler insisted the reason for his decision to plea bargain
was the duress caused by talk of the electric chair.97
The controversy surrounding the issue of plea bargaining in capital
cases dates to the United States Supreme Court decision in Fay v. Noia.98
In that case, the Court held that waiver of a constitutional right is not
valid if induced by fear of the death penalty.99 The defendant in Noia did
not file for appeal of a murder conviction based on a coerced confession
because of fear that retrial would result in reconviction and the death
penalty.10 Because of this fear, the Court held that the defendant could
not be allowed to waive his rights to federal habeas corpus relief.101
92. See generally Hughes, Pleas Without Bargains, 33 RUTGERS L. Rav. 753, 753 (1981)
("Plea bargaining... threatens many values embodied in the Bill of Rights and, indeed,
many values and interests of any rational and moral criminal justice system.").
93. Id. at 753-54.
94. The broad constitutional question of plea bargaining is beyond the scope of this com-
ment. For a general discussion, see Hughes, supra note 92; Philips, The Question of Volun-
tariness in the Plea Bargaining Controversy: A Philosophical Clarification, 16 LAw & Soc'v
REV. 207 (1981-82).
95. McAllister & Green, Media Descend on Self-Convicted Inmate, Richmond Times-
Dispatch, Aug. 22, 1982, at C-1, col. 3. Three minutes after Seigler agreed to plea bargain,
the jury returned to say he should be acquitted. Id.
96. Id.
97. Id. at C-2, col. 5-6.
98. 372 U.S. 391 (1963). See also Halberstam, Towards Neutral Principles in the Admin-
istration of Criminal Justice: A Critique of Supreme Court Decisions Sanctioning the Plea
Bargaining Process, 73 J. CRiM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1, 18-19 (1982).
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Seven years later, however, the question of pleading guilty to avoid the
risk of death came before the Supreme Court in Brady v. United
States.10 2 The Court in Brady held that the defendant's plea was "intelli-
gently made. He was advised by competent counsel, he was made aware
of the nature of the charge against him .... [He] was aware of precisely
what he was doing. . ". .", 3 In conclusion, the Court stated: "Although
[the defendant's] plea of guilty may well have been motivated in part by
a desire to avoid a possible death penalty, we are convinced that his plea
was voluntarily and intelligently made and we have no reason to doubt
that his solemn admission of guilt was truthful."'04 In Parker v. North
Carolina,0 5 decided the same day, the Court reemphasized "that an oth-
erwise valid plea is not involuntary because induced by the defendant's
desire to limit the possible maximum penalty ....
The Brady and Parker cases were decided before the Furman decision
against arbitrary and capricious imposition of the death penalty'0 7 and
the Gregg decision setting the standard for death penalty statutes. 0 8
However, Parker and Brady remain good law. The only question in these
decisions concerned the "voluntariness" of the guilty plea. The courts
have held that advising an accused of possible consequences of conviction
does not amount to coercion. 10 9
B. Ambiguity and "Voluntariness"
The ambiguity in the Supreme Court decisions concerning plea bar-
gaining in capital cases has fueled the controversy, especially since the
Court has no current pronouncement on point. In Noia the Court held
that a constitutional right to habeas corpus relief was not waived by fail-
ure to appeal in time because of the defendant's fear of the death pen-
alty. However, that same fear, by itself, was judged insufficient to render
a guilty plea involuntary in capital cases. The Supreme Court seems "de-
termined not to weaken the plea bargaining process"" 0 and to construe
narrowly any limits on the process.
102. 397 U.S. 742 (1970).
103. Id. at 756.
104. Id. at 758.
105. 397 U.S. 790 (1970).
106. Id. at 795.
107. See supra notes 6-9 and accompanying text.
108. See supra notes 10-17 and accompanying text.
109. See Hopkins v. Anderson, 507 F.2d 530, (10th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 920
(1975). Cf. Giles v. Beto, 437 F.2d 192, 195 (5th Cir. 1971) (holding a guilty plea is valid
unless "induced by threats, misrepresentations, or improper promises"); Jackson v. Cox, 435
F.2d 1089, 1094 (4th Cir. 1970) (applying Virginia law and holding that "[tihe inevitable
discussion of potential punishment in plea bargaining is not so coercive that it renders a
subsequent plea involuntary").
110. See Halberstam, supra note 98, at 22.
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The arguments focus on the definition of "voluntary." When a defend-
ant is faced with impending death, can his decision to avoid it be charac-
terized as truly voluntary? Opponents of the plea bargaining process ar-
gue that choosing between a possible death sentence and a lesser but
more certain penalty is really not voluntary negotiation at all."" Advo-
cates of plea bargaining urge that a defendant has a better bargaining
situation with the process than in any "no-bargain"system.
11 '
The controversy is waged in philosophical as well as legal terms, but
the ambiguity of what constitutes "voluntary" has yet to be resolved. The
problem can only be addressed through judicial guidance, but the possi-
bility of new guidance is remote. The victims of the system will find no
relief without direct evidence that threats and coercion have prompted
the guilty plea.
V. CONCLUSION
The controversy surrounding the death penalty has changed little in
light of the Coppola execution. Central issues have arisen from certain
ambiguities and lack of concrete guidance in the recent decisions. The
future seems to offer neither enlightenment nor significant change.
Any death penalty statute will be reviewed against the criteria estab-
lished by Gregg and its companion cases.113 Laws which do not comply
with those limits will be stricken as unconstitutional per se; laws which
conform to the Gregg guidelines will be questioned as to constitutional
interpretations in light of Godfrey.1 4 However, the state authorities have
been given great deference in defining their statutory terms and in follow-
ing those definitions.11 5 Virginia is no exception.116 As long as the statu-
tory guidelines are followed, there is little chance of an arbitrary and ca-
pricious imposition of the death penalty.
As for waiver of discretionary appeal, there is little question as to its
constitutionality as long as the death-row inmate is adjudged compe-
tent.117 Whether termed "state assisted suicide" or a voluntary decision,
the system will allow those who want their death sentence carried out
ample opportunity to do so. Thus, an execution may, to some extent, de-
pend on the will of the convicted felon, since provisions for administering
the death penalty allow ample opportunity to delay execution.'
1 8
111. See Philips, supra note 94, at 208.
112. Id. at 212.
113. See supra notes 10-17 and accompanying text.
114. See supra notes 25-27 and accompanying text.
115. See supra notes 28-30 and accompanying text.
116. See supra notes 31-47 and accompanying text.
117. See supra notes 71-78 and accompanying text.
118. See generally, Note, Administering the Death Penalty, 39 WAsH. & LEE L. REv. 101
(1982) (discussing the various avenues of appeal and the problems inherent in the adminis-
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However, for defendants who face capital charges, fear of a possible
death sentence is not considered a mitigating factor in the ultimate deci-
sion to plead guilty to a lesser charge. 119 Whether viewed as a voluntary
or involuntary decision, precedent regards discussion of possible execu-
tion in the context of plea bargaining as lacking in coercive power.
120
The effects of the recent imposition of the death penalty remain pure
conjecture. But, the Coppola case was not decidedly different from any in
the past six years in that the positions have not changed and in that the
established law was followed.
James T. Lloyd, Jr.
tration of the death penalty).
119. See supra notes 102-06 and accompanying text.
120. See supra notes 107-09 and accompanying text.
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